Moral particularism and cultural relativism
| dc.contributor.author | Özkaracalar, Tuğrul | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-07-12T21:36:50Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2024-07-12T21:36:50Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2007 | en_US |
| dc.department | Fakülteler, Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | Moral particularism, which is basically a reaction to universalistic (or principle- based) moral theories in its defense that moral reflection does not depend on an appropriate provision of objective moral principles, has often been criticized for its closeness to moral relativism which basically asserts that there is nothing in moral reflection that can “transcend the local". Margaret Urban Walker States that moral particularism is not moral relativism although both of them deny universalism which asserts that morality concerns human beings as such in the sense that moral principles “attach to everyone just as human”, and “must concern features or interests any human being just as such could have”; because in its denial, relativism, unlike particularism, does not have any recourse to objectivity, i.e. the area that is beyond the local. I think moral particularism's recourse to objectivity stems mainly from its acceptance of a certain notion of‘human nature’. In Walker’s own words, “human beings are the kinds of beings who deeply care about, find meaning and identity, in certain sorts of structures and features of their lives, even if in quite different versions, combinations, and weightings of these elements”. A strikingly similar line of thought is apparent in Kari Duncker’s objectivist situational meanings thesis which has been used of by Michele M. Moody-Adams in her objectivist argument against moral relativism. I believe if we take moral particularism’s recourse to objectivism (as opposed to moral relativism) granted, this attitude might help moral particularism to keep a distance between itself and moral relativism; this establish itself as an independent moral theory. And we need such an independent theory for two reasons: i- there should be something in our moral reflection that “transcends” the local, so that we can have the power to judge the local; and, ii- objectivity in morality is an ‘achievement’ that can be reached through moral inquiry (of the particularities), so that we can guard ourselves against so-called ‘objectivities’ that are imposed on us from the outside. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | Özkaracalar, T. (2007). Moral particularism and cultural relativism. Maltepe Üniversitesi, Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi. 1(2), s. 1-18. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.endpage | 18 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1303-3115 | |
| dc.identifier.issue | 2 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.startpage | 1 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12415/6654 | |
| dc.identifier.volume | 1 | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Maltepe Üniversitesi | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi | en_US |
| dc.relation.publicationcategory | Uluslararası Hakemli Dergide Makale - Başka Kurum Yazarı | en_US |
| dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 United States | * |
| dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | en_US |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/ | * |
| dc.snmz | KY00954 | |
| dc.subject | Moral particularism | en_US |
| dc.subject | Cultural relativism | en_US |
| dc.subject | Moral relativism | en_US |
| dc.subject | Objectivism | en_US |
| dc.title | Moral particularism and cultural relativism | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication |
