Interactions of Legislative Environment, Ownership Structures and Control Rights: A Review of Literature
Küçük Resim Yok
Tarih
2011
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Canadian Center Science & Education
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
The legislative environment prevailing in an economy can be an important determinant of how the firms are governed and the extent to which minority shareholders and other stakeholders are protected. The results of empirical literature on legislative environment as an external corporate governance mechanism indicate that legal and regulatory mechanisms are fundamental determinants in the evolution of corporate governance structures (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2002). In an ideal corporate governance model, one share is equal to one vote which means that cash flow right (ownership right) is equal to the control right (voting right). In reality, trade offs exist between ownership and control rights in every system no matter what the country's corporate governance system is classified as: - an outsider (dispersed ownership structure) or insider (concentrated ownership structure) -. This paper aims to investigate the comprehensive literature on investors protection topic and taxonomy of different corporate governance systems of countries from various legal origins. In this context, this paper analyzes different mechanisms to concentrate or diffuse control rights with reference to Turkish Commercial Code and Capital Market Laws.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Corporate Governance, Ownership, Legislative Environment, Control And Cash Flow Rights
Kaynak
Journal of Politics And Law
WoS Q Değeri
N/A
Scopus Q Değeri
Cilt
4
Sayı
1
