Interactions of Legislative Environment, Ownership Structures and Control Rights: A Review of Literature
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Date
2011
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Canadian Center Science & Education
Access Rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Abstract
The legislative environment prevailing in an economy can be an important determinant of how the firms are governed and the extent to which minority shareholders and other stakeholders are protected. The results of empirical literature on legislative environment as an external corporate governance mechanism indicate that legal and regulatory mechanisms are fundamental determinants in the evolution of corporate governance structures (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2002). In an ideal corporate governance model, one share is equal to one vote which means that cash flow right (ownership right) is equal to the control right (voting right). In reality, trade offs exist between ownership and control rights in every system no matter what the country's corporate governance system is classified as: - an outsider (dispersed ownership structure) or insider (concentrated ownership structure) -. This paper aims to investigate the comprehensive literature on investors protection topic and taxonomy of different corporate governance systems of countries from various legal origins. In this context, this paper analyzes different mechanisms to concentrate or diffuse control rights with reference to Turkish Commercial Code and Capital Market Laws.
Description
Keywords
Corporate Governance, Ownership, Legislative Environment, Control And Cash Flow Rights
Journal or Series
Journal of Politics And Law
WoS Q Value
N/A
Scopus Q Value
Volume
4
Issue
1
